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Abstract— The demand of portable and body-worn devices 
for remote health monitoring is ever increasing. One of the 
major challenges caused by this influx of wireless body area 
network (WBAN) devices is security of user’s extremely vital and 
personal information. Conventional authentication techniques 
implemented at upper layers of the Open System Interconnec- 
tion (OSI) model usually consumes huge amount of power. They 
also require significant changes at hardware and software levels. 
It makes them unsuitable for inherently low powered WBAN 
devices. This letter investigates the usability of a double threshold 
algorithm as a physical layer security measure in these scenarios. 
The algorithm is based on the user’s behavioral fingerprint 
extracted from the radio channel characteristics. Effectiveness of 
this technique is established through experimental measurements 
considering a variety of common usage scenarios. The results 
show that this method provides high level of security against 
false authentication attacks and has great potential in WBANs. 
Index Terms— Wireless body area networks, physical layer 
security, radio channel features, authentication. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs) have seen a rapid 
growth in the recent years. Though its applications range from 
surveillance to entertainment and sports to   military, remote 
health monitoring still serves as  the prime focus. Health care 
devices using IEEE 802.15.6 and IEEE 802.15.4j standards are 
now part of thousands of house- holds [1]–[7]. Along with 
numerous benefits, WBAN devices suffer from a number of 
challenges. Privacy of user and security of a highly personal 
data based on remote observation of user’s vital physical 
parameters is one of the major issues. Low power 
requirements due to inherent nature of the body- worn 
devices and regulatory restrictions further complicate 
provision of efficient security measures in such devices. 
Authentication of user’s identity is  the  first hurdle in devel- 
opment  of  a  secure  system  before  responding  to  a   general 
 
 
security breach and attack [8].  Recent studies  show  that  IEEE 
802.15.6 standard still has a long way to go to ensure privacy of 
the user [9]. In-home health care devices are at a greater risk of 
potential theft of pre-shared key. Traditional encryption 
methods have therefore, limited ability of denying admission to 
an attacker in the network posing as a legitimate node [10]. On 
top of that, these conventional security methods usually require 
high power and substantial changes at hardware and software 
levels. Hence, there is an apparent need to devise new and 
improved processes for the certification  of the WBAN nodes. 
Use of Physical Layer Security (PLS) technology based on 
antenna and propagation channel characteristics can be a well- 
suited alternative to the conventional security methods for the 
WBANs. However, benefits of the PLS cannot be exploited to 
its full extent using traditional protocols by combining 
802.15.6 standard for power consumption and emergency 
transport requirements [11]. 
Some progress in this direction has been reported in the 
literature. Ali et al. have proposed a mechanism to  secure  the 
data provenance for body-worn devices by exploiting spatio-
temporal characteristics of  the  wireless  channel  [12]. In [13], 
wave is used as the noise to assist matching of legal nodes. Shi 
et al. [14] have used Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) 
to deal with the issue of  authentication  of the nodes in the 
network. This letter presents a new user authentication 
technique for the  WBAN  devices  based  on  the combinations 
of user’s behavior fingerprint and channel features, which 
improves the system security. WBAN sensor nodes equipped 
with an external antenna has been used to extract the channel 
characteristics and fingerprint of the user’s habitual actions. A 
number of our daily life scenarios are considered. The 
experimental results have shown that the proposed 
authentication method is very proficient in repelling large 
number of low-level security attacks. Moreover, it does not 
require a key sharing resulting in a very energy efficient 
operation. 
Following the introduction in this section, the letter is orga- 
nized in five sections. Section II, describes the methodology 
and experimental setup. Section III establishes  the  usability 
and distinguished ability of the proposed scheme through 
experimental results and detailed analysis. Conclusions are 
drawn in Section IV. 
II. METHODLOGY AND EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
The experiments are conducted in a  laboratory  envi- 
ronment replicating a common home-based health care 
scenario. A battery-powered wearable health-monitoring 
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Fig. 1. Illustration of two experimental regions; non-trust region (outer circle) 
having MSs B, D, T and E monitoring the user brushing teeth, drinking water, 
taking medicine and eating breakfast; limited-trust region (inner circle) having 
the WHMD node W. 
 
 
device (WHMD) has been positioned on  the  right upper  arm 
of the user. The WHMD communicates continuously with the 
monitoring station (MS) connected to a  computer  placed  in 
the same room at a distance of 10m. Four daily life actions of 
brushing teeth, drinking water, taking medicine, and eating 
breakfast are considered in this experiment. The WHMD 
monitors the changes in the radio channel  characteristics 
caused by the user’s actions and exchanges the RSSI data with 
the MS. The MS gathers and stores this data, which provides 
the behavioral fingerprint of the user. It is then used for the 
identity authentication. 
In a typical indoor environment, radio wave will propagate 
along multiple paths. Each path will carry different amount of 
fading and time delay. The complex baseband signal voltage 
here is defined as: 
where Vi and θi are the amplitude and phase of the ith path, 
N is the total number of paths. The RSSI is defined as: 
Taking the human body presence in consideration, Equation 2 
can be expanded as: 
 
where EI F is the environmental loss factor and User [m, s] 
represents the multipath shadow component due to the user 
motion. 
To clearly describe the initial security status of the WBAN 
nodes, the  measurement area  is  divided  into  a  non-trust and 
a limited-trust region (Fig. 1). The  nodes  located  in  non-  
trust region are considered to  have  an  initial  security  status 
of being suspect and may be compromised. On contrary, the 
limited-trust region is envisaged to be equipped with basic 
safety protection measures (for example random storage, etc.). 
The nodes located in this region are therefore not easy to be 
compromised and set to have an initial security status of being 
safe. 
Security of the WHMD is  relatively easier  to be breached  
as it can get missing or stolen due to user’s carelessness. It is 
therefore. Considered to be in non-trust region. The  MS  has 
got fixed installation and less susceptible to stealing. It is there- 
fore placed in the limited-trust region. Complete trust for the 
Fig. 2. WHMD and MS1-4 communication timing diagram. 
 
 
 
MS is however, not realistic as it stores highly sensitive data. 
Since, this study is intended to prove the  idea, considerations  
in the experimental scenarios are kept simple and advanced 
hardware or active attacks are not taken into  account.  They 
will be however, studied in future expansion of this work. 
Four common habits of any user are considered namely 
brushing teeth, drinking water, taking medicine and eating 
breakfast. The measurements were taken by making the human 
subjects to repeat the considered habitual action repeatedly  
over the course of the measurement. The variations in the 
channel characteristics in the form of RSSI values are moni- 
tored by the WHMD in each  scene. It is  then transmitted to  
the MS that keep a record of it. 
Fig. 2 shows the communication timing  diagram between  
the WHMD and the MSs. M S1     4 represents the four moni- 
toring stations, one in each scenario. When the subjects arrive  
at the designated measurement scene,  the WHMD  broadcasts  
a WHM D_hello packet. On receiving this WHM D_hello 
packet, the MS enters into the active monitoring state and  
sends an MS_hello packet to the WHMD showing its readi- 
ness to receive the WHMD data. The WHMD then starts send- 
ing the WHM D_ ping packets until it receives an MS_OK 
packet from the MS indicating that the MS has gathered 
sufficient information. During this communication, the MS 
reads the RSSI value of the WHM D_ ping packets for the 
characterization of the radio channel to be used for authentica- 
tion. In addition to the RSSI value, the WHM D_ ping packets 
also carry other statistics, such as time alignment, battery con- 
sumption, etc. This data is however non-sensitive and does not 
contain any private information. Thus the identification process 
hardly has any extra packet consumption and no added energy 
burden to the system. The MS gathers RSSI  measurements 
from each WHM D_ ping packet at 500ms interval. These 
measurements are randomly stored in the module flash. 
Both the  WHMD  and  MS  are  wireless  modules  based  
on Texas Instruments system-on-chip (SOC) for  wireless 
sensor networking solutions, C8051 MCU configuration and 
control communication unit. The HBE-ubiquitous Sensor 
Network (USN) module is used  as the  WHMD.  It employs  
the IEEE 802.15.4 standard and can be programmed to achieve 
output power levels of  25.2 dBm to 0.6 dBm. The sensitivity  
of the receiver is 94 dBm. The onboard sensors are equipped 
with circularly polarized, omnidirectional  antennas  operating 
at 2.4 GHz. The module can be used in a variety of WBAN 
applications as meets the low power consumption and wireless 
management requirements. 
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Fig. 1. Illustration of two experimental regions; non-trust region (outer circle)
h ving MSs B, D, T and E monitoring the us r b hin teeth, drinking water,
taking medici e and eating breakfast; limited-trust region (inner circle) having
the WHMD node W.
device (WHMD) has been positioned on the right upper arm
of the user. The WHMD communicates continuously with the
monitoring station (MS) connected to a computer placed in
the same room at a distance of 10m. Four daily life actions of
brushing teeth, drinking water, taking medicine, and eating
breakfast are considered in this experiment. The WHMD
monitors the changes in the radio channel characteristics
caused by the user’s actions and exchanges the RSSI data with
the MS. The MS gathers and stores this data, which provides
the behavioral fingerprint of the user. It is then used for the
identity authentication.
In a typical indoor environment, radio wave will propagate
along multiple paths. Each path will carry different amount of
fading and time delay. The complex baseband signal voltage
here is fi s:
V =
N∑
i=1
∥Vi∥ e− jθi (1)
where i and θi are the amplitude and phase of the i th path,
N is t t t l nu ber of paths. The R SI is defined as:
RSSI [d Bm] = 10log2
(
∥V∥2
)
(2)
Taking the human body presence in consideration, Equation 2
can be e a e as:
M SRSS I [d Bm] = W H M DRSS I + E I F +User [m, s] (3)
where E I F is the environmental loss factor and User[m, s]
repr sents the multipath shadow component ue to the user
motion.
To clearly describe the initial security status of the WBAN
nodes, the measurement area is divided into a n n-trust and
a limited-trust region (Fig. 1). The nodes located in non-
trust region are considered to have an initial security status
of being suspect and may be compromised. On contrary, the
limited-trust region is envisaged to be equipped with basic
safety protection measures (for example random storage, etc.).
The nodes located in this region are therefore not easy to be
compromised and set to have an initial security status of being
safe.
Security of the WHMD is relatively easier to be breached
as it can get missing or stolen due to user’s carelessness. It is
therefore. Considered to be in non-trust region. The MS has
got fixed installation and less susceptible to stealing. It is there-
fore placed in the limited-trust region. Complete trust for the
Fig. 2. WHMD and MS1-4 communication timing diagram.
MS is however, not realistic as it stores highly sensitive data.
Since, this study is intended to prove the idea, considerations
in the experimental scenarios are kept simple and advanced
hardware or active attacks are not taken into account. They
will be however, studied in future expansion of this work.
Four common habits of any user are considered namely
brushing teeth, drinking water, taking medicine and eating
breakfast. The measurements were taken by making the human
subjects to repeat the considered habitual action repeatedly
over the course of the measurement. The variations in the
channel characteristics in the form of RSSI values are moni-
tored by the WHMD in each scene. It is then transmitted to
the MS that keep a record of it.
Fig. 2 shows the communication timing diagram between
the WHMD and the MSs. M S1−4 represent the four moni-
toring stations, one in each scenario. When the subjects arrive
at the designated measurement scen , the WHMD broadcasts
a W H M D_ hello packet. On receiving this W H M D_ hello
packet, he MS ent rs into he active monit ring state nd
sends an M S_ hello packet to the WHMD showing its readi-
ness to receive the WHMD data. The WHMD then starts send-
ing the W H M D_ ping packets until it receives an M S_ O K
packet from the MS indicating that the MS has gathered
sufficient information. During this communication, the MS
reads the RSSI value of the W H M D_ ping packets for the
characterization of the radio channel to be used for authentica-
tion. In addition to the RSSI value, the W H M D_ ping packets
also carry other statistics, such as time alignment, battery con-
sumption, etc. This data is however non-sensitive and does not
contain any private information. Thus the identification process
hardly has any extra packet consumption and no added energy
burden to the system. The MS gathers RSSI measurements
from each W H M D_ ping packet at 500ms interval. These
measurements are randomly stored in the module flash.
Both the WHMD and MS are wireless modules based
on Texas Instruments system-on-chip (SOC) for wireless
sensor networking solutions, C8051 MCU configuration and
control communication unit. The HBE-ubiquitous Sensor
Network (USN) module is used as the WHMD. It employs
the IEEE 802.15.4 standard and can be programmed to achieve
output power levels of −25.2 dBm to 0.6 dBm. The sensitivity
of the receiver is −94 dBm. The onboard sensors are equipped
with circularly polarized, o nidirectional ante nas operating
at 2.4 GHz. The m dule can be used in a variety of WBAN
applications as me ts the low power consumption and wireless
management requiremen s.
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where Vi and θi are the amplitude and phase of the i th path,
N is the total number of paths. The RSSI is defined as:
RSSI [d Bm] = 10log2
(
∥V∥2
)
(2)
Taking the human body presence in consideration, Equation 2
can be expanded as:
M SRSS I [d Bm] = W H M DRSS I + E I F +User [m, s] (3)
where E I F is the environmental loss factor and User[m, s]
represents the multipath shadow component due to the user
motion.
To clearly describe the initial security status of the WBAN
nodes, the measurement area is divided into a non-trust and
a limited-trust region (Fig. 1). The nodes located in non-
trust region are considered to have an initial security status
of being suspect and may be compromised. On contrary, the
limited-trust region is envisaged to be equipped with basic
safety protection measures (for example random storage, etc.).
The nodes located in this region are therefore not easy to be
compromised and set to have an initial security status of being
safe.
Security of the WHMD is relatively easier to be breached
as it can get missing or stolen due to user’s carelessness. It is
therefore. Considered to be in non-trust region. The MS has
got fixed installation and less susceptible to stealing. It is there-
fore placed in the limited-trust region. Complete trust for the
Fig. 2. and S1-4 communication timing diagram.
is ho ever, not realistic as it stores highly sensitive data.
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ill be ho ever, studied in future expansion of this work.
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tored by the in each scene. It is then transmitted to
the S that keep a record of it.
Fig. 2 shows the co unication ti ing diagram between
the H D and the Ss. M S1−4 represents the four moni-
toring stations, one in each scenario. hen the subjects arrive
at the designated measurement scene, the WHMD broadcasts
a W H M D_ hello packet. On receiving this W H M D_ hello
packet, the MS enters into the active monitoring state and
sends an M S_ hello packet to the WHMD showing its readi-
ness to receive the WHMD data. The WHMD then starts send-
ing the W H M D_ ping packets until it receives an M S_ O K
packet from the MS indicating that the MS has gathered
sufficient information. During this communication, the MS
reads the RSSI value of the W H M D_ ping packets for the
characterization of the radio channel to be used for authentica-
tion. In addition to the RSSI value, the W H M D_ ping packets
also carry other statistics, such as time alignment, battery con-
sumption, etc. This data is however non-sensitive and does not
contain any private information. Thus the identification process
hardly has any extra packet consumption a d o adde nergy
burden to the sy tem. The MS gathers RSSI measurements
from each W H M D_ ping packet at 500ms interval. These
measurements are randomly stored in the module flash.
Both the WHMD and MS are wireless modules based
on Texas Instruments sy tem-on-chip (SOC) for wireless
sensor networking solutions, C8051 MCU configuration a d
control com unication unit. The HBE-ubiquitous Sensor
Network (USN) module is used as the WHMD. It employs
the IEEE 802.15.4 standard and can be programmed to achieve
output power lev ls of −25.2 dBm to 0.6 dBm. The sensitivity
of the receiver is −94 dBm. The onboard sensors are equipped
with circularly polarized, omnidirectional antennas operating
at 2.4 GHz. The module can be used in a variety of WBAN
applications as meets the low power consumption and wireless
management requirements.
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having MSs B, D, T and E monitoring the user brushing teeth, drinking water,
taking medicine and eating breakfast; limited-trust region (inner circle) having
the WHMD node W.
device (WHMD) has been positioned on the right upper arm
of the user. The H D communicates continuously with the
monitoring station (MS) connected to a computer placed in
the same room at a distance of 10m. Four daily life actions of
brushing teeth, drinking water, taking medicine, and eating
breakfast are considered in this experiment. The WHMD
monitors the changes in the radio channel characteristics
caused by the user’s actions and exchanges the RSSI data with
the MS. The MS gathers and stores this data, which provides
the behavioral fingerprint of the user. It is then used for the
identity authentication.
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Fig. 3. Prototype and S11 of the meandered line external antenna used with 
HBE-USN-module. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Measurement scenario for the user in drinking water configuration 
showing location of the WHMD and the MS with three sets of randomly 
saved RSSI data recorded by the MS. 
 
 
The HBE-USN-Sensor tag module is programmed to trans- 
mit a power level of 1.5 dBm at 2.425 GHz communication 
channel to avoid interference with existing Wi-Fi signal avail- 
able in the experimental area. Communication between the 
WHMD and the MS is established using an external antenna 
connected to  the  HBE-USN-Sensor  tag  via  an  SMA  port,  
as shown in Fig. 3. The antenna is of meandered line type 
operating at 2.4 GHz with good impedance matching and has 
dimensions of  26mm  26mm   1mm. The  antenna prototype 
and measured S11 of the antenna is illustrated in Fig. 3. 
 
III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
The RSSI data has been measured for the four considered 
user habits. Fig. 4 shows the measurement scenario  for  the 
user in drinking water configuration along with three sets of 
randomly stored RSSI data by the MS. To simplify the idea and 
ease of understanding, 36 packets are collected and  divided 
into three sets in  this work. In  practical scenarios, the  length 
of the data could be longer producing better randomness. 
The RSSI sequence based on the fingerprint of user’s 
habitual behavior is difficult to replicate or reproduce. In this 
environment, the WHMD is needed to  be  certified  by  the  
MS who is acting as the certifier. The authentication scheme 
has two processes namely behavioral fingerprint registration 
and identity authentication resulting in a double threshold 
authentication, as shown in Fig. 5. 
In order to compare the behavior of the user with the legal 
template, correlation coefficient (CC) is computed as: 
 
 
where Xi and Yi are the ith packet of RSSI values, X and Y 
are the mean values of RSSI sequence. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Double threshold authentication scheme consists of the behavioral 
fingerprint registration and identity authentication processes. 
 
TABLE I 
CORRELATION RESULTS FOR THE NORMAL CERTIFICATION 
USING DOUBLE THRESHOLD TECHNIQUE 
 
 
The authentication scheme is implemented in four  steps. 
Step one is the acquisition of the subject’s behavior fingerprint 
by the MS, segmentation of the data and random storage as the 
template. Step two involves the repetition of the same behavior 
by the subject wearing the WHMD and collection of the new 
channel characteristics by the MS.  Step  three  comprises  of 
the MS calculation of the CC of  the  new  channel  features 
with the previously stored information in step  one.  Finally, 
step four involves the  certification  of  the  WHMD  by  the  
MS through double threshold authentication. Certification is 
granted if correlation value with each template is more than 0.8 
and traversal or correlation between two data segments is more 
than 0.85. It shows that the behavioral fingerprint of the user 
seeking certification is in good match with the fingerprint of  
the legal user (template). This employs that the current subject 
can be perceived as  the  legal  user  since  it  is  very  difficult 
to reconstruct the radio channel. If the subject wearing the 
WHMD passes the authentication stage, its security status 
(which was in the  non-trust  region  at  the  beginning) would 
be elevated to the limited-trust region. 
The MS  receives  the  RSSI  data  from  the  WHMD  for  
the four considered scenarios. This forms the legal behavior 
template of the user and is being stored at the MS. To further 
strengthen the security, this data storage can use certain 
protection measures, such as fragmented storage or feature 
extraction. This work uses the fragmented storage  approach 
due to its simplicity and effectiveness by dividing and storing 
the RSSI data into three segments. The correlation results for 
the  three segments of the WHMD data have been summarized 
in Table I. The results show that the double threshold algorithm 
ensures high level of security. It ensures that the user only 
achieve identity authentication if correlation with the template 
is greater than 0.8 and traversal correlation or correlation of 
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Fig. 3. Prototype and S11 of the meandered line external antenna used with
HBE-USN-module.
Fig. 4. Me surement scenario for the user in drinking water configuration
showing location of the WHMD and the MS with three sets of randomly
saved RSSI data recorded by the MS.
The HBE-USN-Sensor tag module is programmed to trans-
mit a power level of −1.5 dBm at 2.425 GHz communication
channel to avoid interference with existing Wi-Fi signal avail-
able in the experimental area. Communication between the
WHMD and the MS is established using an external antenna
connected to the HBE-USN-Sensor tag via an SMA port,
as shown in Fig. 3. The antenna is of meandered line type
operating at 2.4 GHz with good impedance matching and has
di ensions of 26mm× 26mm× 1mm. The antenna prototype
and measured S 11 of the antenna is illustrated in Fig. 3.
III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The RSSI data as been measured for the four considered
user habits. Fig. 4 shows the measurement scenario for the
user in drinking water configuration along with ree sets of
randomly stored RSSI data by the MS. T simplify the i ea an
ease of understanding, 36 packets are collected and divided
into three sets in this work. In practical sce arios, the length
of the data could be longer producing better randomness.
The RSSI sequence based on the fingerprint of user’s
habitual behavior is difficult to replicate or reproduce. In this
environment, the WHMD is needed to be certified by the
MS who is acting as the certifier. The authentication scheme
has two processes namely behavioral fingerprint registration
and identity authentication resulting in a double threshold
authentication, as shown in Fig. 5.
In order to compare the behavior of the user with the legal
template, correlation coefficient (CC) is computed as:
CC =
∑n
i=1
(
Xi − X¯)(Yi − Y¯ )√∑n
i=1
(
Xi − X¯)2√∑ni=1(Yi − Y¯ )2 (4)
where Xi and Yi are the i th packet of RSSI values, X and Y
are the mean values of RSSI sequence.
Fig. 5. Double threshold authentication scheme consists of the behavioral
fingerprint registration and identity authentication processes.
ABLE I
CORRELATION RESULTS FOR THE NORMAL CERTIFICATION
USING DOUBLE THRESHOLD TECHNIQUE
The authentication scheme is implemented in four steps.
Step one is the acquisition of the subject’s behavior fingerprint
by the MS, segmentation of the data and random storage as the
template. Step two involves the repetition of the same behavior
by the subject wearing the WHMD and collection of the new
channel characteristics by the MS. Step three comprises of
the MS calculation of the CC of the new channel features
with the previously stored informati n in step one. Finally,
step four involves the certification of the WHMD by the
MS through double threshold authentication. Certification is
granted if correlation value with each templ te is more than 0.8
and traversal or correlation between two data segments is more
than 0.85. It shows that the behavioral fingerprint of the user
seeking certification is in good atch with fing rprint of
the legal us r (template). This employs that the curr nt subje t
can be pe ceived as the legal user since it is very difficult
to reconstruct the radio channel. If the subject wearing the
WHMD passes the authentication stage, its security status
(which was in the non-trust region at the beginning) would
be elevated to the limited-trust region.
The MS receives the RSSI data from the WHMD for
the four considered scenarios. This forms the legal behavior
template of the user and is being stored at the MS. To further
strengthen the security, this data storage can use certain
protection measures, such as fragmented storage or feature
extraction. This work uses the fragmented storage approach
due to its simplicity and effectiveness by dividing and storing
the RSSI data into three segments. The correlation results for
the three segments of the WHMD data have been summarized
in Table I. The results show that the double threshold algorithm
ensures high level of security. It ensures that the user only
achieve identity authentication if correlation with the template
is greater than 0.8 and traversal correlation or correlation of
 
 
 
Fig. 6. CC results for the simulated attacks against the double threshold 
authentication algorithm, (a) Brushing Teeth, (b) Drinking Water, (c) Taking 
Medicine, (d) Eating Breakfast. 
 
 
two data segments is more than 0.85 indicating high match to 
the user behavioral fingerprint. 
This double threshold approach is not only a very efficient 
authentication method but also has strong resistance to the 
attackers. Three simulated attacks are studied to  depict vigor  
of the proposed technique against the attackers. Worst-case 
scenario is analyzed assuming that the attackers have compro- 
mised the WHMD by reaching the limited-trust region (it is 
very difficult in realistic conditions due to high isolation and 
protection provided by traditional measures such as locked 
doors). These simulated attackers, with similar physique, 
observe and imitate the action of  legal  user  in  every  scene. 
To further test the strength of the proposed approach, these 
simulations were repeated 10 times. 
The results in Fig. 6 show that in even the worst-case 
scenarios, the attacker cannot succeed in the identity fraud. 
Only the  attacker  1  in  brushing  the  teeth  scene  has  found  
a rare success, as depicted in Fig. 6(a). Here, two sequence 
relativity values are greater than 0.85 indicating that the feature 
is very obvious. This is due to the fact  that  the  Brushing  
Teeth motion of the simulated attacker  is  similar  to  that  of 
the legal user. However, due to the existence of multiple 
authentication base stations, the fake attacker was unable to 
complete the attack. Also, this is a rare hit which cannot be 
repeated multiple times as no other success is observed in the 
following simulations. Usefulness of  the  proposed algorithm 
in the identity authentication and against security attacks is 
evident from these results. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A new technique for the user identification in WBAN sensor 
nodes is presented. This physical layer security method is  
based on the observation of the user’s behavioral fingerprint 
through radio channel characteristics. The body-worn WHMD 
sends channel information to a static MS. The proposed 
technique makes use of double threshold identification strategy 
calculating correlation between first and subsequent RSSI 
samples received by the MS and traverse correlation between 
different segments of the sample data itself. Three simulated 
attacks are also used to study the strength of the proposed 
technique against the attackers. 
Results based on the experimental data collected consider- 
ing four daily life scenarios of brushing teeth, drinking water, 
taking medicine and eating breakfast show that the proposed 
technique can effectively realize the identity recognition and 
has good resistance to the attackers. The WHMD only sends 
non-sensitive information packets and the channel character- 
istics at the time of transmission are unknown to it with 
minimum privacy at stack. The MS receives the channel 
characteristics sequences in the form of the RSSI stored 
randomly in the flash. It also ensures resistance against the 
attacks in the WBAN home health care scenarios. Furthermore, 
this method does  not  demand  any  hardware  upgrades  and  
no additional packet transmissions are required minimizing 
energy consumption. 
These features make this method very suitable for low- 
power WBAN applications containing highly sensitive private 
data. Future aspects of this work include enhancement of the 
robustness of this method with added security of the WBAN 
applications. 
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